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Crisp strides have been made in eliminating physical hazards from the 
workplace and ensuring a safe working environment. Efforts to influence 
the behavior of workers, however, have proceeded haltingly. Solutions for 
handling the "people" aspects of safety are negligible. 
The present study focused on a select psychological technique, the 
behavior analysis approach, which has recently been demonstrated to facili-
tate the safety practices of workers on the job. In a recent study, for 
instance, the principal investigator and her associates successfully imple-
mented a behavioral safety program in a wholesale bakery, which resulted 
in a substantial reduction in injuries. Desired safety practices were 
specified and assessed approximately three times a week for six months. 
Employees received instruction in avoiding unsafe practices and their 
safety performance level was recorded on a graph for all to see. The 
results: from performing safely 70% and 78% of the time, employees in two 
of the most accident-ridden departments substantially improved their per-
formance to 96% and 99%, respectively. When no feedback was provided, per-
formance dropped back to the original level (71% and 72%). As a result, it 
was concluded that the behavioral safety program was responsible for the 
improvements in performance. 
Despite the positive results, some questions have arisen about the 
relative contribution of the training and feedback components of such behav-
ioral programs. Was it necessary to provide feedback? Wouldn't it be suf-
ficient simply to provide safety training? 
To answer these important questions, the present research compared the 
relative contribution of these components. To rule out the effect of super-
visory participation, each component contained the same frequency of super-
visory involvement. 
Desired safety practices were specified for four departments in a poultry 
processing plant in the state of Georgia. Subsequently, on-site observations 
were conducted approximately three times per week over a 46-week period. A 
multiple-baseline design across groups was used in which the following con-
ditions were introduced: 1) Antecedent Control (safety rules explained, 
illustrated, and displayed; new rule posted 3 times per week; weekly super-
visor meeting discussing rules), and 2) Consequent Control (feedback graph 
explained, interpreted, and displayed; feedback posted 3 times per week; 
weekly supervisor meeting discussing feedback). 
Employees showed only slight improvements during the Antecedent Condi-
tion, but performance increased significantly during the Consequent Condition 
in all groups. Employees were performing 85% of the items safely; in three 
departments the mean scores were over 90%. Furthermore, employees reported 
they preferred the Consequent Condition. Personnel noted they particularly 
liked obtaining information following their performance. The results demon-
strate that even though employees were reminded frequently and supervisors 
discussed safety weekly, the addition of a consequence such as feedback was 
more effective in sustaining safe practices and was better received by workers 
than the rules and reminders. 
Although feedback is readily accepted, questions often arise about its 
long-term effects: will such a benign consequence be effective over an 
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extended period of time? Are other back-up reinforcers necessary? Thus, 
the second purpose of the present research was to assess whether feedback 
would be effective in maintaining performance over an extended period of 
time. The study under discussion was continued for another 29 weeks, for 
a total duration of 75 weeks, making possible the assessment of feedback 
effectiveness over a six month period in all four departments. 
The results showed that thrice weekly feedback, in combination with a 
weekly supervisory meeting and the posting of safety rules, was capable of 
maintaining safety performance for an extended period of time. The results 
also highlight the importance of one dimension of feedback: the frequency 
with which it is provided. Performance declined and became more variable 
in two departments when feedback was provided only once a week. When the 
frequency was returned to thrice weekly, however, performance improved once 
again. 
Countless safety programs fail, however, not because of faulty concep-
tion, but because of a lack of top management commitment. One of the pro-
posed ways to obtain this commitment is to show how safety affects the bottom 
line: profits. Although safety and health should not be promoted from a 
financial point of view alone, it is generally agreed that management is 
more likely to enthusiastically endorse, fund, and implement efforts which 
have an effect on company profits. Thus, the third purpose of the present 
research was to assess the financial impact of a behavioral safety program 
on workplace accidents by taking into consideration both direct and indirect 
costs. The direct costs included both medical and indemnity payments made 
by the insurance carrier. The indirect or uninsured costs were determined 
by identifying the events triggered by injuries (e.g., time spent by super-
visory personnel) and then determining the cost associated with each event 
(e.g., average amount of time spent per accident x average hourly wage). 
To determine the cost savings, if any, that occurred as a result of the 
behavioral safety program, the costs attributable to injuries were assessed 
for the three conditions during the first 46-week period and then for the 
same periods during the preceding four years, 1975-1978. Although no clear 
cut conclusions could be drawn about the cost savings resulting from the 
program, this portion of the research illustrated a methodology for assessing 
the financial impact of workplace accidents. 
Complete descriptions of each of the three research questions concerning 
a) the relative contribution of the training and feedback aspects of behav-
ioral safety programs, b) the long-term effects of feedback, and c) the 
financial assessment of workplace accidents are included below. For any 
further questions, please contact Judi Komaki, Ph.D., Georgia Institute of 
Technology, Engineering Experiment Station, Atlanta, Georgia 30332. 
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Comparison of Antecedent and Consequent Control Approaches 
to Occupational Safety 
Although safety in the workplace has recently received an enormous 
amount of attention, solutions for handling its "people" aspects are still 
negligible. In contrast to the strides made in eliminating physical hazards 
from the workplace, efforts to influence the behavior of workers have 
proceeded haltingly. Ellis (1975) concluded in a review of the safety 
performance literature that "the quality and intensity of research necessary 
to draw firm conclusions...were found to be remarkably inadequate" (p. 180). 
Several recent studies have demonstrated the effectiveness of the 
behavioral approach in improving the safety and health of workers on the job 
(Smith, Anger & Uslan, 1978; Sulzer-Azaroff & de Santamaria, 1980; Sulzer-
Azaroff, 1978; Zohar, 1980). The senior author and her associates, for 
instance, successfully implemented a behavioral safety program in a food man-
ufacturing plant (Komaki, Barwick & Scott, 1978). Desired safety practices 
were specified and assessed approximately three times a week for six months. 
The program consisted of a brief training session followed by regular feed-
back on the safety performance level. Employees substantially improved their 
safety performance, and the injury frequency rate declined. 
Even with the positive results of such behavioral programs, the relative 
contribution of the antecedent and consequent components has been questioned. 
Was it necessary to provide feedback? Perhaps workers improved because they 
finally knew what to do. Why not just provide safety training? 
The belief in safety training is fervent and longstanding (e.g., Ander-
son, 1975; Leslie & Adams, 1973; Milutinovich & Phatak, 1978). To illustrate: 
The fact that the industrial trucking accident rate has not declined in spite 
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of the availability and use of excellent training materials led to the 
conclusion that "the failure lies--not in the training programs--but in how 
they are taught" ("Operator Training," 1975, p. 45). 
In response to this issue, the senior author and her associates re-
cently compared the relative effectiveness of training and feedback for 
employees in a vehicle maintenance facility (Komaki, Heinzmann & Lawson, 
1980). The antecedent training mponent was presented alone. Its effects 
were assessed before the introduction of the second feedback component. 
Safety training and rules alone resulted in slight but insignificant im-
provements; only with feedback did performance improve substantially. 
Close analysis of the above study, however, revealed that at least two 
factors differed between the components in addition to the feedback: stimu-
lus changes and supervisory involvement. As in many training programs, the 
information was provided on a c - -shot basis; safety was the subject of one 
training session but was not necessarily mentioned again. In contrast, the 
graphs were updated three or more times a week. More importantly, perhaps, 
supervisors provided the feedback. Thus, the greater effectiveness of the 
feedback procedure may have been due to the greater frequency of stimulus 
changes and/or supervisor participation rather than the feedback per se. 
Thus, the present research compared the relative contribution of the ante-
cedent and consequent control components of the previous behavioral safety 
program. Each component contained the same frequency of supervisory involve-
ment and stimulus changes. The heavy reliance on such antecedent techniques 
as training and reminders in the area of safety and the widely acknowledged 
role of supervisors in the success of any safety program make this a particu-




Subjects and Setting  
The study was conducted in a poultry (hens, broilers, roosters, and 
leg-horns) processing plant in the southeastern portion of the United States. 
The plant employs approximately 275 persons and contains eleven departments: 
Live Dock, Picking, Evisceration, Chill and Pack, Cut-up and Bagging, Shipping, 
Clean Up, Route Drivers, Maintenance, Office Personnel, and Management. Em-
ployees are primarily involved in hanging, trimming, eviscerating, sorting, 
cutting, and packing operations. The major portion of work is on processing 
lines which run at the rate of 2,000 to 6,000 birds per hour. 
The Chill and Pack, Cut-up and Bagging, and Evisceration departments 
were selected for study. The largest of these departments, Evisceration, was 
divided, for the purpose of the study, into two approximately equal groups, 
labelled Evisceration I and II. Employees, in the four departments numbering 
approximately 200, earned from $3.10 to $3.26/hour at the beginning of the 
study. As is typical in the processing industry, turnover was high (209%). 
That is, an average of two persons were hired for every position during the 
course of a single year. 
These four departments were selected because in the year preceding the 
study 79% of the lost workday cases had occurred in them. The injury incidence 
rate for the plant as a whole, however, was relatively low. There were an 
average of 7 lost workday cases per year for the three years prior to the 
study, and an injury and illness incidence rate of 2.6 lost workday cases per 
100 full-time employees. The comparable rate for the poultry and egg process-




At the beginning of the research, the plant management arranged for 
a voluntary safety and health audit, a recent service supported largely by 
federal funds. Examination of the physical plant showed relatively few 
safety hazards. With the exception of one item, all hazards that were 
found were classified "other than serious". All hazards were corrected 
during the first month of the research. 
Measure 
Specification of safe peformance. The first step in the research 
was to define the desired behaviors and outcomes. Two primary sources of 
information were used: a) the accident/injury experience over the last three 
years, and b) interviews with supervisors and selected employees. 
All plant accidents were first grouped by department (e.g., Eviscera-
tion) and then by employee position (e.g., gizzard peelers). Each group of 
accidents was then analyzed to (determine whether they were preventable, 
(i.e., whether workers could avoid having similar incidents by altering their 
behavior). Preventable accidents were further examined to determine critical 
actions that would avoid future injuries. Researchers asked on-site person-
nel to describe, or preferably to model, what an employee should do to 
perform the operation safely. 
Written descriptions of each operation spelled out the desired actions. 
Interrater reliability checks determined if the descriptions were clear and 
the observational procedures feasible. If one observer noted an observation 
was done safely and the other observer recorded it was done unsafely, the 
wording or procedures were changed, where appropriate. Revisions continued 













Activity to be Categorized 
Trimmer 
Racker 





5 birds per 
employee 
5 birds per 
employee 
At point of 
arrival 
When sharpening, use only 
top 2/3 of steel. 
When cutting, look toward 
cutting area. 
When pulling craw, pull 
straight down, not 
toward trough edge. 
When racking, wear 
protective head gear. 
Evisceration I Gizzard 
cutter 




Observational procedures. Circumstances dictated the conditions under 
which items were observed. 	Some activities were observed until they had 
been completed a fixed number of times (e.g., trimming five chickens). In 
these cases, one occurrence of an unsafe act was sufficent to score the 
entire activity as unsafe. Other items were observed as soon as the observer 
entered the department (e.g., wearing protective hard hats while packing 
frozen hens). Finally, some infrequently occurring activities were scored 
when they occurred in the presence of the observer (e.g., operating a 
pallet jack). Each item was scored as either safe, unsafe, or not observed. 
The percentage of items scored as safe for each department was computed by 
dividing the number of items scored safe by the total number of items scored 
safe and unsafe. This percentage constituted the dependent measure for the 
study. 
Data Collection  
A total of 124 observations were made approximately three times a week 
(2.7) over a 46-week period. Observations began in February and ended in 
January of the next year. Each observation session took 20 to 30 minutes in 
each department, for a total time of approximately 90 minutes. 
Interrater Reliability  
During the formal data collection period, interrater reliability was 
assessed 16 times, for an average of one reliability check every 8 observa-
tions. The percentage agreement method was used in which the number of 
agreements is divided by the number of agreements and disagreements and then 
multiplied by 100. 
Because of the relatively high percentage of items scored safe, relia-
bility was computed separately for safe and unsafe items. For the unsafe 
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items, for instance, an agreement was scored when both observers indepen-
dently marked the item as unsafe. A disagreement was scored when the primary 
observer marked the item unsafe and the other observer failed to mark the 
same item unsafe. If only an overall reliability score were presented, the 
preponderance of safe items could overshadow the unreliability of the rela-
tively few unsafe items. 
Reliability for the safe items exceeded the reliability for the unsafe 
items, as expected. Observers agreed on 1,029 out of 1,076 of the safe items, 
for an average reliability of 96%. For the unsafe items, however, observers 
agreed on 198 out of 254 items, for an average reliability of 78%. 
Conditions  
The study included two different conditions. In the Antecedent Control 
Condition, the safety rules were explained and illustrated via 35 mm. slides 
at an initial meeting; the rules were displayed in each department; a new 
rule was highlighted three times a week; and supervisors discussed the rules 
at a weekly safety meeting. In the Consequent Condition, the feedback graph 
was explained and interpreted at an initial meeting; the graph was posted; 
feedback was provided three times a week; and each supervisor discussed the 
feedback at a weekly safety meeting. 
Table 2 outlines how both stimulus changes and supervisory involvement 
were held constant in the two conditions. The posters were changed three 
times a week and supervisors held weekly safety meetings throughout. 
Antecedent condition. A meeting with the personnel in each department 
began the Antecedent Condition. Although personnel were performing relatively 











Posting of display 
Supervisor present at 
initial meeting in which 
rules explained and slides 
shown. 
Rules displayed in each 
department. 
"Rule of the day" changed 
3 times per week. 
Supervisor conducts weekly 
meeting, lasting 5-10 min., 
in which "rule of the day" 
discussed. 
Supervisor present at 
initial meeting in which 
feedback graph explained 
and shown. 
Feedback graph displayed 
in each department. 
Feedback posted 3 times 
per week. 
Supervisor conducts 
weekly meeting, lasting 









of accidents. Slides depicted supervisors performing various operations 
unsafely. After each unsafe action was shown, personnel were asked to point 
out why the action was unsafe. A slide displaying safe performance was then 
shown and the safety rule emphasized. Finally, a poster listing the safety 
rules was presented and employees were encouraged to abide by the rules. 
After the initial meeting, the poster was mounted on a wall, in a 
conspicuous place, in the respective departments. In addition to the list of 
rules, this poster also contained an open space at the top, where one rule 
was highlighted as the "rule of the day." This rule was accompanied by 
photographs of the safe and unsafe methods of performing the task. Observers 
changed the "rule of the day" and the corresponding photographs approximately 
three times a week. 
Beginning the week after the initial meeting, each supervisor held 
a safety meeting approximately once week. During these meetings, which 
lasted five to ten minutes, the supervisor emphasized the importance of 
safety, pointed out the "rule of the day," reminded employees of safe and 
unsafe ways of performing the highlighted rule, and answered questions 
regarding other safety rules. 
Consequent condition. During the Consequent Control Condition, the 
observers continued to change the posters three times a week and the super-
visors held the safety meetings each week. The content of each of these 
changed, however. The top section on the poster which had been used to 
highlight a safety rule was replaced with a graph. It showed the data points 
plotted during the Baseline and Antecedent Condition and included an unplot-
ted section for the Consequent Condition. 
At the first meeting of the Consequent Condition, the information pre- 
Comparison of 
12 
sented in the graph was described. It was pointed out that safety perfor-
mance was already at a reasonably high level but that improvements could 
further decrease the likelihood of accidents. Personnel were informed that 
the observers would continue to collect information on their safety perfor-
mance but that following each observation, the observers would post the 
results on the graph. Personnel could then determine how safely they had 
performed their operations. 
Three times a week observers updated the graphs. In addition, photo-
graphs depicted safe and unsafe ways of performing one of the items scored 
unsafe in that observation. If all items were scored safe (100%), a photo-
graph showing the supervisor smiling was posted. 
During the subsequent weekly meetings, which also lasted approximately 
five to ten minutes, the supervisor emphasized the importance of safety. 
However, instead of reminding employees about the safety rules, the supervi-
sor reviewed the safety scores since the last meeting, and noted some of the 
items that were consistently safe or improving, as well as items that had 
been scored unsafe for the week. 
Design  
A multiple-baseline design across groups allowed comparison of the effec-
tiveness of the two conditions. Baseline data were collected repeatedly in 
all four departments, after which the Antecedent Condition was introduced in 
the first department. Approximately five weeks later, the Antecedent Con-
dition was introduced in the second department. Again following a five week 
period, the Antecedent Condition was introduced in the third department and 
so on. In the same staggered fashion, the Consequent Condition was introduced 
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Mean Safety Level 
and Net 
(and Standard Deviations) 
Improvements 
Departments 
Condition Means Improvements 










Chill & Pack 78 83 95 + 	5 + 17 + 12 
(12) (12) ( 	8) 
Evisceration I 63 66 85 + 	3 + 22 + 19 
(11) ( 	9) ( 	7) 
Evisceration II 79 84 92 + 	5 + 13 + 	8 
( 	7) ( 	7) ( 	4) 
Cut up & 78 90 96 + 12 + 18 + 	6 




Condition effectiveness. Figure 1 shows the percentage of items per-
formed safely on an observation-by-observation , basis during the two condi-
tions. Table 3 lists the means and standard deviations for each condition, 
as well as the net improvements obtained from condition to condition. 
During Baseline employees performed safely from three-fifths to four-
fifths of the time. The Evisceration I department had the lowest baseline 
mean of 63%, whereas the remaining three departments obtained baseline means 
of 78% or 79%. 
The Antecedent Condition had mixed results. For two departments (Chill 
and Pack and Evisceration 1), the Antecedent Condition did not result in 
either an increase or a decrease. One department (Cut-up and Bagging) im-
proved from a Baseline mean of 78% to an Antecedent Condition mean of 90%. 
Another department (Evisceration II) increased only 5%, however, the improve-
ments were stable. 
During the Consequent Condition, the results were clear. All departments 
improved their safety level for an average increase of 18% over Baseline. In 
addition, average increases of 11% were obtained over and above those which 
occurred during the Antecedent Condition. At the end of the Consequent 
Condition, employees in all four departments were performing at least 85% of 
the items safely; the mean scores of three departments were over 90%. 
Autoregressive integrated moving averages analysis. In addition to a 
visual analysis, the data were analyzed statistically using an analysis 
developed for time-series data called an Autoregressive Integrated Moving 
Averages (ARIMA) analysis. This analysis transforms the data, using the 
least squares solution, to remove serial dependencies within the data and 
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performs a t-test on the transformed data to compare changes in the slope and 
level of scores across conditions. It can assess whether there is a signifi-
cant and immediate change in level from one phase to another. For further 
details, refer to Box and Jenkins (1970), Glass, Wilson, and Gottman (1975), 
and Jones, Vaught, and Weinrott (1977). 
The results of the ARIMA analysis (Table 4) confirmed the interpretations 
based on a visual inspection of the data. There were no statistically sig-
nificant changes in two departments (Chill and Pack and Evisceration I) 
and significant changes in two departments (Evisceration II and Cut-Up and 
Bagging) between Baseline and the Antecedent Condition. Significant effects 
were shown in all departments, however, when comparisons were made between 
Baseline and the Consequent Condition, as well as the Antecedent and Consequent 
Condition. This verified the fact that during the Consequent Condition 
employees not only improved over their Baseline level, but also over their 
Antecedent level. 
Condition preference. Employees were polled about their preferences 
after they had a minimum of six weeks experience with both the Antecedent and 
the Consequent Control Conditions (between observations 90 and 96). They 
were asked to indicate on a card (Fig. 2) which of the two conditions, dubbed 
the "rules" or the "graph" they liked better. To make their choice meaning-
ful, they were told that management had agreed to implement the choice of the 
majority for at least one month. In addition to the polling, a random sample 
of workers (21) was interviewed to see why they preferred one condition over 
another. 
Almost three quarters of the workers polled (72%) reported that they 




Results of the Autoregressive Integrated Moving Averages Analysis 
Departments in Processing Plant 
Comparison 
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Evi 

















*** *** *** *** 












Probability of the observed change as determined by a t-test comparison. 
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they that liked the feedback better because they could "see how well they 
were doing." Several employees noted that people paid more attention to the 
graph than to the rules. No negative comments were made about the Consequent 
Condition per se even by persons who preferred the Antecedent Condition. In 
fact, the only reason that workers gave for liking the rules better than the 
graph was a lack of knowledge about graphs. One worker simply stated that she 
"liked the rules best because I don't know nothing about the lines." Based 
on the above findings, the supervisors reexplained how to read the graph at 
the next meeting, and the Consequent Condition was continued for the remain-
der of the study. 
Prior to the polling of employees, supervisors were asked to predict 
which condition their employees would prefer and why they would prefer it. 
All supervisors correctly judged that the majority of employees would favor 
the graph, with all mentioning the fact that employees could see how they 
were doing. The supervisors themselves either had no preference for one 
condition or the other or they preferred the graph over the rules. One sup-
ervisor noted that the rules would help in training new people but that after 
a while the rules would just be there and employees would adapt to them. 
Supervisory and management participation. During the construction of 
the observational code, supervisors and management willingly described and 
modelled critical actions for avoiding future accidents, and they made 
additional suggestions. During the Antecedent Condition, supervisors had 
little problem reminding employees of one or more of the safety rules. 
During the Consequent Condition, there was a tendency to dwell on what had 
been done wrong rather than what had been done right, even though the re-
searchers emphasized the importance of recognition for a job well done. One 
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supervisor, for instance, questioned whether he needed to have a meeting 
since his department had obtained three 100%'s the previous week! Eventually, 
supervisors began pointing with pride to improvements shown on the graphs. 
As adjacent departments obtained graphs, informal competition arose with 
supervisors checking to see which department had scored higher or had the 
longest string of 100%s. 
The researchers encouraged management to recognize supervisors for their 
role in the safety program and for improvements in the safety level. One 
supervisor noted after one such mention that it was virtually the only time 
that anyone had ever said a positive word to him about his performance in his 
nine years of working at the plant. 
To ensure that the weekly meetings were held, management was encouraged 
to attend the meetings in conjunction with, or separate from, one of the re-
searchers each week. This was done for approximately five months. As man-
agement attendance dropped during the last three months, the frequency of the 
meetings also wavered. In an attempt to bolster the supervisor's meetings, 
management instructed supervisors to complete a card noting the date, time, 
length, and subject of each meeting. However, there was little follow-
through on management's part. 
Accident/injury experience. There was a reduction in the number of lost 
workday cases from an average of 7 per year for the three years prior to the 
study to 5 for the year of the study. Because of the relatively low initial 
incidence rate, however, it is difficult to judge the magnitude of this 
reduction. 
Discussion 
The present research demonstrated the importance of consequences as a 
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source of change in work settings. With frequent reminders and weekly discussions, 
performance either remained the same or improved slightly. With the addition 
of consequences in the form of feedback, employees upgraded their performance 
over and above the changes which occurred after the rules and reminders. 
Thus, it is concluded that antecedent strategies alone are not sufficient. 
Consequent control is the crucial component in substantially improving and 
maintaining performance. 
In addition to its increased effectiveness, feedback was better received 
by workers. Personnel indicated that they particularly liked obtaining 
information following their performance. The preference of employees for a 
consequent rather than an antecedent control strategy further encourages the 
use of feedback in work settings. 
The relative effectiveness of these two components is particularly rele-
vant to the occupational safety field, in which the emphasis is often placed 
on the provision of safety training and the posting of rules and reminders. 
This study suggests that although proper training is essential, safety 
training and reminders alone are inadequate; more attention should be devoted 
to the provision of consequences; and feedback is an effective and readily 
accepted motivational strategy. 
Several aspects of the behavioral safety program were particularly 
noteworthy. A unique contribution was made by the behavioral measurement 
system. It provided an accurate, representative, and objective view of 
desired performance. Workers, supervisors, and management better understood 
what and how workers were expected to perform. The measurement system 
allowed the collection of information about the level of safe performance. 




The effectiveness of feedback in changing safety performance is particu-
larly interesting in that group rather than individual feedback was provided. 
Data were presented just as those shown in Figure 1. This is an advantageous 
finding since group data are far easier and less time consuming to provide 
in applied settings, such as the present one, in which several hundred employees 
are involved and turnover rates are high. 
A plethora of questions remain. One regards the long-term effects 
of a relatively benign consequence such as feedback. Will it be effective 
over an extended period of time? Are other back-up reinforcers necessary? 
Few studies have assessed the impact of programs over extended periods of 
time; and feedback programs in work settings are no exception to this general 
negligence. In the present study, the performance improvements remained 
steady in all departments. However, the duration of the feedback phase ranged 
from two to six months for the last and the first departments, respectively. 
It would be interesting to assess the impact of feedback over an extended 
period of time in all departments to see whether there would be decrements in 
performance which would necessitate other back-up reinforcers. 
A related issue involves the frequency of feedback. It is widely accep-
ted that feedback should be communicated frequently. At the same time, it 
has been demonstrated that less reinforcement is necessary once the behaviors 
have been established. In the two previous safety studies conducted by the 
senior author and her associates (Komaki et al., 1978; Komaki et al., 1980), 
as well as in the present study, feedback was provided three to four times a 
week. The substantial improvement in safety level indicates that, at least 
in these settings, the frequency was sufficient. However, there are questions 
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about the frequency necessary to maintain performance. Must one continue 
providing feedback as often? Can feedback be provided less often, while 
still maintaining the improvements? If the same level of performance 
could be maintained with less frequent feedback, considerable savings in 
implementation would result. However, little information exists regarding 
the frequency of reinforcement in applied settings. A systematic investiga-
tion of the frequency of feedback would surely benefit future programs 
utilizing feedback in work settings. 
Still another issue involves supervisory and management personnel. Once 
the critical features of an effective program are demonstrated, implementation 
becomes critical. An in-house capacity must be established if programs are 
to be continued on a long-term basis. The problem of keeping supervisory 
personnel actively involved in program implementation, however, is commonly 
acknowledged. Unfortunately, a review of the literature reveals few well-
controlled studies demonstrating the efficacy of programs designed to improve 
supervisory participation. Although the business literature is replete with 
recommendations and speculations, there is little direct evidence of sustained 
supervisory participation. The contingency management approach with its 
emphasis on behavioral specification and worker motivation may help to enhance 
supervisory participation in the area of safety as well as other areas of 
organizational functioning. 
The present study demonstrates the importance of consequent control 
strategies and the potential of the behavioral approach in improving safety 
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Long-term Effects of Feedback 
in a Work Setting 
Within the last decade, behavioral programs have been successfully 
introduced in a variety of business, industry, and government settings. 
While the improvements have often been dramatic, they have not necessarily 
been sustained. In a recent review of the organizational behavior management 
literature, Andrasik and his associates (in press) note the limited followup 
of most studies. 
Among the reasons for the limited followup is that workers or management 
sometimes object to the type of consequence being provided or the manner in 
which it is presented. This, in turn, affects the longevity of the program 
and its subsequent evaluation. Pedalino and Gamboa (1974), in a study 
designed to decrease absenteeism at a manufacturing distribution facility, 
reported that management terminated the lottery incentive program after 16 
weeks because of potential union demands. Yukl and Latham (1975), in one of 
the first studies of reinforcement schedules in a work setting, found that 
several workers and at least one supervisor disapproved of the procedure 
used in the variable reinforcement groups--guessing the outcome of a coin 
flip--because they believed it was a form of gambling. 
Feedback, on the other hand, is readily accepted by both workers and 
management. Employees in a recent study (Komaki, Collins, & Hutcheson, Note 
1), who were polled about their preference, voted overwhelmingly (72%) for 
the feedback, noting they liked it better than training and reminders because 
they could see how well they were doing. Although feedback has been reported 
effective in a variety of work settings (e.g., Cooper, Thomson, & Baer, 1970; 
Kim & Hamner, 1976; Nadler, Mirvis, & Cammann, 1976; Panyan, Boozer, & 
Morris, 1970; Quilitch, 1975; Sulzer-Azaroff, 1978; Sulzer-Azaroff & de Santa- 
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maria, 1980; "Performance Audit," 1972), questions often arise about its 
long-term effects: Will such a benign consequence be effective over an 
extended period of time? Are other back-up reinforcers necessary? 
Like most organizational behavior management studies, however, the 
impact of feedback programs has not been assessed over an extended period of 
time. The senior author and her associates, for instance, have successfully 
used feedback to improve the safety practices of employees in a food manufac-
turing plant (Komaki, Barwick, & Scott, 1978), a vehicle maintenance facility 
(Komaki, Heinzmann, & Lawson, 1980), and a poultry processing plant (Komaki, 
et al, Note 1). In all three studies, information about safety performance 
was collected and posted on departmental graphs three to four times a week. 
Unfortunately, however, in the first two studies, the feedback phases lasted 
for only 3 to 11 weeks. Thus, one of the purposes of the present study was 
to capitalize on the relatively long duration of the third study and assess 
whether feedback would be effective in maintaining performance over an 
extended period of time. 
The present study is a continuation of the third study, which compared 
the relative contributions of an antecedent and a consequent control component 
(Komaki, et al., Note 1). During the consequent control component, employees 
in a poultry processing plant were observed and given feedback on departmental 
graphs three times a week. By the end of the 46-week study, employees in four 
departments had obtained feedback about their safety level for 12 to 30 weeks, 
depending on their department. The present study continued for another 29 
weeks, for a total duration of 75 weeks, enabling the assessment of feedback 
effectiveness over a six month period of time in all four departments. 
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A stringent test of the long-term effects of feedback was provided. 
Employees had opportunities to perform safely or unsafely thousands of times 
an hour; processing lines ran at the rate of 2,000 to 6,000 birds an hour. 
Other studies utilizing feedback with working adults have sometimes assessed 
its effect for as long as 13 months. However, the target behaviors occurred 
much less frequently--one to three training sessions per day (Panyan et al., 
1970) and weekly/monthly corrections of hazardous laboratory conditions 
(Sulzer-Azaroff, 1978). 
A related issue involves the frequency of feedback necessary to maintain 
performance in an applied setting. It is widely accepted that information 
about work performance should be communicated often (Anderson, Kulhavy, & 
Andre, 1971; Cook, 1968; Ilgen, Fisher, & Taylor, 1979; Ivancevich, Donnelly, 
& Lyon, 1970). Lawler and Rhode (1976) in their book on Information and  
Control in Organizations, for instance, point out that "the frequency and 
rapidness with which information is reported are important factors in 
determining the impact of the information" (p. 43). In the three previously 
discussed safety studies conducted by the senior author and her associates 
(Komaki, et al., 1978; 1980; Note 1), feedback was provided approximately 
three to four times a week. The fact that safe practices improved substan-
tially indicates that, at least in these settings, the frequency was suffi-
cient. 
In most work settings, however, information is provided so infrequently 
as to be almost completely ineffective. The prevailing practice is to 
collect and communicate results to employees every quarter or every year. 
Performance appraisals, for instance, are typically conducted annually. 
Upon hearing the results of behavioral safety programs, management often 
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underestimates the importance of frequency of feedback. A frequent comment 
is: "We already do that. We post the number of accidents each month." 
On the other hand, it has been shown that less frequent reinforcement is 
necessary to maintain behavior once performance is established. It is not 
clear though, whether it is necessary to continue providing feedback several 
times a week or whether the frequency can be reduced. If the same level of 
performance could be attained by providing feedback less frequently, personnel 
time for implementation could considerably decrease, thereby increasing the 
efficiency of the program. 
Little information exists regarding the frequency of reinforcement in 
applied settings, however. Studies concerned with schedules of reinforcement 
in organizational settings have not directly addressed the problem of how to 
maintain performance over extended periods of time (Berger, Cummings & 
Heneman, 1975; Yukl & Latham, 1975; Yukl, Wexley & Seymore, 1972). As a 
result, the second purpose of the present study was to assess the relative 
effectiveness of different frequencies of feedback to determine how often 
feedback should be provided to maintain performance in a given setting. 
Method  
Subjects and Setting  
Since the research was a continuation of the previous study, the sub-
jects (approximately 200 employees working in the Chill and Pack, Cut-up and 
Bagging, and Evisceration I and II departments, who had an annual turnover 
rate of 200%) and site (a poultry processing plant in the state of Georgia) 
were the same. For further information, please refer to Comparison of Antece-
dent and Consequent Control Approaches to Occupational Safety. 
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Measure and Data Collection  
The measure of safe performance and the data collection procedures were 
also identical to those used in the previous study. That is, observers went 
on-site and recorded whether employees performed specific incidents safely or 
unsafely. Data were collected approximately three times a week (2.9) for an 
additional 29 weeks, for 83 more observations. A total of 207 observations 
were conducted over 75 weeks, a period of almost a year and a half. 
Interrater reliability continued to be assessed on both safe and unsafe 
items, using the percentage agreement method. A total of 12 reliability 
checks were made during this period, an average of one reliability check 
every 7 observations. Reliability for the safe and unsafe items averaged 
98% (857/873) and 88% (156/178), respectively, for the four departments. 
Conditions  
Feedback: 3 x week. Feedback continued to be provided three times a week 
during this condition. Departmental data were posted on the graph each time 
an observation was made. This condition continued in the remaining depart-
ments, Evis. I and II and Cut-up and Bagging, until each had received feed-
week thrice weekly for a six month period of time (28-30 weeks). Through- 
out all the conditions, supervisors continued to be encouraged to discuss how 
employees were performing at the weekly safety meetings. As before, the 
information was based on the three observations of the preceding week. 
The purpose of this condition was to assess the effects of feedback with 
four different groups in a work setting over an extended period of time. Six 
months was selected because it was thought to be of sufficient duration to 
reveal most delayed decrements in performance. If decrements occurred, plans 
were to explore other alternatives such as increased supervisory involvement 
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or back-up reinforcers. If performance remained stable, plans were to assess 
the effects of reducing the frequency of feedback. 
Feedback: 1 x week. The frequency of feedback was reduced from three 
times a week to once a week during this condition. Data were collected three 
times a week as before but only one data point reflecting that one day's 
observation was posted each week. The day that feedback was provided was 
selected randomly. The remaining two days' data were not posted. Refer to 
Figure 2 for an indication of the data points that were and were not posted 
during this condition. As in the preceding condition, supervisors were 
encouraged to hold weekly safety meetings and to discuss how employees were 
performing. The only difference was that information was based on the one 
posted observation rather than all three. 
Supervisors were told that their departments had been doing so well that 
the researchers wanted to see what, if anything, would happen if data were 
posted once each week rather than three times each week. When employees 
asked the observers, workers were told that they would not receive information 
every time but that the information would probably be posted the next time. 
The purpose of this condition was to determine whether it is necessary 
to continue providing feedback as often as thrice weekly or whether feedback 
could be provided once a week and still maintain the same results. The 
gradual reduction to once weekly rather than biweekly or monthly was chosen 
to ensure that information would be available for the weekly safety meetings 
which continued throughout. Another reason was that safety performance 
declined in a previous study (Komaki, et al., 1980) in which feedback was 
provided one or two rather than four or five times a week. If performance 
decrements occurred, plans were to return to providing feedback thrice weekly. 
If performance was maintained, plans were to continue the feedback once a week. 
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Feedback: 3 x week. Feedback was again provided three times a week 
during this condition. As before, supervisors were encouraged to discuss the 
feedback with their employees at the weekly safety meeting. 
The purpose of this condition was to determine whether returning to 
thrice weekly feedback would reverse performance decrements which had occur-
red when feedback was provided only once a week. 
Design 
A multiple-baseline design across groups continued to be used to compare 
conditions. The thrice weekly and once weekly conditions were introduced in 
a staggered fashion to each of the four departments. For the sequence and 
duration of each condition, refer to Table 1. 
Results  
Figure 1 shows the percentage of items performed safely for the first 
46-week period (observations 1-124) and Figure 2 shows the next 29-week 
period (observations 125-207). Table 2 lists the means and standard devia-
tions for the total 75-week period for each of the five conditions, including 
the thrice weekly and the once weekly conditions. 
Long-term effects. When feedback was provided thrice weekly, perfor-
mance remained high and steady over the six months. The mean performance 
level was over 85% for all departments, with three out of the four averaging 
over 90%. Figures 1 and 2 show that employees were performing as well at the 
end of the sixth month as they were at the end of the first month. The one 
exception occurred in the Cut-up and Bagging department during a two-week 
period when the proper safety equipment was not available. 





Sequence and Duration of Experimental Conditions 
Across Departments 
Department in poultry processing plant 
Chill S Pack 	 Evis. I  Evis. II 	 Cut-up A Ban 
Condition Seouencel Duration 	Sequence- Duration 	Sequences Duration 	Sequence- Duration  
Baseline 	1-13 	5 vks 	1-27 	10 vks. 	1-40 	15 wks. 	1-52 	20 wks. 
Antecedent 	14-44 	12 vks. 	28-57 	13 wks. 	41-70 	13 vks. 	53-86 	14 vka. 
Consequent: 
3 x week 45-124 	30 wka. 	58-139 	29 vks. 	71-154 	29 vka. 	87-169 	28 vka. 
1 x week 125-175 	17 wks. 	140-196 	19 wks 	155-207 	18 vka. 	170-207 	13 wks. 
3 x week 176-207 	11 wks. 	197-207 	4 wka. 	- 	- 
a
Starting and ending observation. 
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were made to introduce any alternative strategies. Instead, the effect of 
reducing the frequency of feedback was explored. 
Frequency of feedback. The frequency of feedback was reduced from thrice 
to once weekly for approximately four months (17 to 19 weeks) in the first 
three departments and for approximately three months (13 weeks) in the last 
department, Cut-up and Bagging. The reduction in frequency produced mixed 
results. Performance remained high and stable in two departments but there 
were performance decrements and increased variability in the other two 
departments. 
Performance in Evisceration II and Cut-up and Bagging continued at the 
same high and stable level as the previous phase, with means of 89% and 98% 
and relatively low standard deviations of 7% and 6%, respectively. Although 
Cut-up and Bagging experienced the once weekly condition for only three 
months, Figure 2 shows no indications that decrements would have occurred by 
the end of the fourth month. 
In contrast, performance in Chill and Pack declined from a previously 
high mean performance level of 95% to 89% and in Evisceration I from 85% to 
78%. As Figure 2 illustrates, performance also became more variable. 
Standard deviations increased from 8% during the thrice weekly condition to 
12% during the once weekly condition in Chill and Pack and from 6% to 9% in 
Evisceration I. 
As a result of the performance decrements and the increased variability 
in these two departments, feedback was again provided three times a week for 
11 weeks in Chill and Pack and for 4 weeks in Evisceration I. Figure 2 
shows that employees began performing at a higher level than they had when 
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Antecedent 	3 x week 1 x week 
Consequent: 
3 x week 
Chill & Pack 78 83 95 89 91 
(12) (12) ( 	8) (12) (11) 
Evisceration I 63 66 85 78 82 
(11) ( 	9) ( 	6) ( 	9) ( 	4) 
Evisceration II 79 84 92 89 
(7) ( 	7) ( 	4) ( 	7) 
Cut up & 78 90 96 98 
Bagging (13) (11) ( 	7) ( 	6) 
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Chill and Pack department when 	influx of students began working in one of 
the key safety positions (box st 'ar) at the beginning of the summer. 
Discussion  
The results show that thrice weekly feedback, in combination with a 
weekly supervisor meeting and the posting of safety rules, is capable of 
maintaining safety performance for an extended period of time, in this case, 
six months. The sustaining of a consistently high level of performance is 
particularly noteworthy consider -Mg that occasions for safe or unsafe perfor-
ance occurred thousands of times an hour; that performance was maintained 
in all four departments, which included approximately 200 employees and sup-
ervisors with different work styles; and that the turnover rate was over 200%. 
The fact that a consequence such as feedback can maintain performance 
over an extended period has significant implications for the occupational 
safety field, in particular, and for work settings, in general. The results 
suggest that it is not necessary to introduce less indigenous systems such 
as safety contests to maintain performance and that a relatively benign 
consequence can sustain performance in work settings. 
The results of the present study also highlight the importance of one 
dimension of feedback, the frequency with which it is provided. Performance 
declined and became more variable in two departments when feedback was 
provided only once a week. When the frequency was returned to thrice 
weekly, however, performance improved once again. 
It is still not clear whether it is necessary to continue providing feed-
back several times a week or whether the frequency can be reduced, however. 
Performance declined in two departments and maintained in the other two, 
when feedback was reduced to once weekly. One factor which differentiated 
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the two sets of departments, however, was their previous level. In the two 
departments in which performance declined, performance was either lower than 
or more variable than those in which performance was maintained. This 
suggests that the frequency of feedback can be reduced without sacrificing 
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Effects of a Behavioral Safety Program 
on the Financial Cost of Accidents 
Top management commitment to and active involvement in safety has been 
indicated as crucial to program effectiveness (Cohen, 1977; Simonds & Shafai-
Sahrai, 1977 Smith, Cohen, & Cleveland, 1978). One way to obtain this 
commitment is to show how safety affects the bottom line. Although safety 
and health can be justified by other arguments, it is generally agreed that 
management is more likely to enthusiastically endorse, fund, and implement 
efforts which have an effect on company profits. 
Despite this commonly accepted principle, a review of the literature 
reveals numerous articles lamenting the difficulties involved in obtaining 
management support, a few articles heralding cost savings, and almost no 
articles detailing how to determine the financial costs of accidents. 
Documented examples are rare. With few exceptions, data about the cost-
effectiveness of safety programs in general, and behavioral programs in 
particular, are either completely omitted or are based on gross estimates. 
On those occasions when dollar figures are given about cost savings, a 
wealth of questions arise: How was the figure obtained? Did it include both 
direct and indirect costs? Are the figures adjusted for inflation? Are just 
before and after comparisons made? Have other plausible alternative hypothe-
ses been ruled out? 
In one of the most extensive documentations of safety costs, Fox (Note 
1) presents compensation and damage costs as they relate to the frequency and 
severity rate and the number of equipment and vehicle accidents. Indirect 
costs, which Fox himself estimates to be at least as high if not higher than 
the direct costs, however, are neglected. 
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Similarly, although there were reported reductions in the cost of 
workmen's compensation premiums in a previous safety study by the senior 
author (Komaki, Barwick, & Scott, 1978), no systematic estimates were made of 
the savings resulting from such indirect or uninsured costs as (a) the cost 
of wages paid for working time lost by workers viewing or discussing the 
accidents, (b) the net cost to repair, replace, or straighten up damaged 
materials or equipment, (c) the cost of wages paid for working time lost by 
injured workers other than workmen's compensation payments, (d) the extra 
costs due to overtime, (e) the cost of wages paid supervisors while their 
time is required for activities necessitated by the injury, (f) the wage cost 
due to decreased output of the injured worker after return to work, (g) the 
cost of the learning period of new workers, (h) the uninsured medical cost 
borne by the company, and (i) the cost of time spent by higher supervision 
and clerical workers on investigations or the processing of compensation 
application forms. As a result, this study assessed the financial impact of 
a behavioral safety program on work place accidents by taking into considera-
tion both direct and indirect costs. 
Although frequently proposed by safety specialists (Grimaldi & Simonds, 
1975), assessing the financial impact of work place accidents is a relative-
ly new field of endeavor for the accounting profession. Traditionally, the 
focus has been on the quantity and quality of goods and services and the 
implications of their production, such as profit and return on investment. 
Recently, however, increasing attention has been directed to practices 
viewed as having an effect on productivity, such as absenteeism, turnover, 
work disruptions, and accidents. 
To express indicators of work performance fitting this broader conception 





proposed (Alexander, 1971; Flamholz, 1974; Herrick, 1975; Macy & Mirvis, 
1976). Distinctions are made between various human resource accounting asset 
and expense models. Asset models reflect the organizations' investment in 
employees and are directed toward assessing the value of employees as capital-
ized resources. The logic behind asset valuation is that investments in 
employees produce benefits beyond the current accounting period. As a result 
the costs of training the employee and, perhaps, the employee's experience 
within the company would be included in assessing the financial impact of an 
accident should the person not return or return with limited capability. 
Expense models, on the other hand, measure the economic effects of 
employees' behavior. This approach, sometimes referred to as behavioral 
accounting, looks at what the individual does and attaches costs to these 
activities. Researchers at the Institute for Social Research at the University 
of Michigan (Macy & Mirvis, 1976; Mirvis & Macy, 1976; Mirvis & Lawler, 1977) 
have developed a standardized appoach for identifying, defining, and measuring 
indicators of work performance and the methods for expressing indicators such 
as accidents in financial terms. A series of steps assigns fixed, variable, 
and opportunity costs to a behavior. In the case of accidents, for example, 
one first asks whether (a) the worker is missing from his/her station, (b) 
there is a replacement from an extra work force, or (c) a replacement is 
transferred from another job. If it is determined that a replacement is 
transferred from another job, then one assesses whether the replacement is 
adequately trained for the job and determines production and quality changes, 
and training costs. 
Although the expense model proposed above seems to be well conceived, few 
studies have been reported demonstrating the use of this model in assessing 
the financial impact of accidents. Furthermore, no assessments have been made 
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in an experimental setting. A unique contribution was made in the present 
study because it assessed the financial impact of work place accidents 
which occurred before and after the introduction of a behavioral safety 
program designed to improve safe practices and reduce work injuries. 
Method  
Setting  
The subjects were approximately 200 employees in the Chill and Pack, 
Cut-up and Bagging, and Evisceration I and II departments of a poultry 
processing plant in the state of Georgia. Desired safety practices were 
identified. Information about the safety performance level was collected for 
46 weeks. Following Baseline, two conditions were introduced: a) an Antece-
dent Condition consisting of the presentation of safety rules and reminders, 
and b) a Consequent Condition involving all aspects of a behavioral safety 
program, the presentation of safety rules and reminders and the provision of 
feedback about safety performance. To assess the relative contribution of 
the two conditions, a multiple-baseline design was used in which the condi-
tions were introduced at staggered intervals. Refer to Figure 1. The 
staggering of the conditions and the replication of the effects in four 
departments effectively ruled out other extraneous factors such as history, 
maturation, and statistical regression which might otherwise be thought to be 
responsible for any of the changes. During the Consequent Condition, safety 
performance significantly improved over and above that of both the Baseline 
and the Antecedent Condition. Employees were performing on the average, at 
least 85% of the activities safely, and in three departments, over 90%. It 
was concluded that the behavioral safety program was responsible for the 
significant performance improvements. 
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To determine the cost savings, if any, that occurred as a result of the 
behavioral safety program, the costs attributable to job-related injuries 
were assessed during the Baseline, Antecedent, and Consequent Conditions for 
the 46-week period of the study. Data were also obtained for comparable 
periods during the preceding four years, 1975, 1976, 1977, and 1978. These 
data were used to rule out seasonal and yearly fluctuations. If fewer 
accidents usually occurred during the winter when the Consequent Condition 
was in effect, then a comparison restricted to only the Baseline and Antece-
dent Condition during a single year would be misleading. 
Define injury/accident. The first step in identifying costs associated 
with injuries was to define what is meant by an injury. For the purpose of 
this study, an injury was defined as an incident that resulted in the seeking 
of medical attention. This included lost workday, medical treatment, and 
first aid cases resulting in medical attention. The reason for the aggrega-
tion of OSHA-reportable accidents and non-OSHA incidents was the site's 
limited medical capabilities and the policy regarding the treatment of 
injuries which resulted in the seeking of outside medical assistance for 
almost all reported injuries. 
Assess insured costs. Costs were viewed as either insured or uninsured. 
This distinction is similar to that made between direct and indirect costs 
but it has the additional advantage of highlighting those items not covered 
by the insurance premium. To assess the insured costs, the medical and 
indemnity payments made by the Workmen's Compensation carrier were obtained 
from the quarterly summaries provided by the carrier. To take into account 
the inflation rate, each year's figures were adjusted using the Consumer 
Price Index (CPI) figures with 1979 as the base year. For medical payments, 
the medical component of the CPI was used for adjustments. 
Assess uninsured costs. To identify the uninsured costs, project staff 
held interviews modeled after procedures developed at the Institute for 
Social Research at the University of Michigan (Macy & Mirvis, 1976). In 
essence, this procedure tries to logically develop the sequence of events 
triggered by an accident and then determine the cost associated with each 
event. For example: Is an injured worker replaced or is the slack taken 
up by present workers? Does the replacement require training? Is overtime 
required to make up for the lost worker? Does the supervisor accompany the 
worker to the first aid station? Who is involved in processing paperwork? 
What are the salary continuation provisions? 
The following categories were identified as being triggered by an 
accident/injury: 
1. Time of injured employee till he or she either returns to work or is 
taken off the clock; 
2. Time of supervisor while attending to accident, accompanying worker 
to first aid station, and/or arranging work to cover for employee; 
3. Time of office personnel processing paperwork; 
4. Time of first aid personnel attending to injuries or transporting 
employee to physician; 
5. Disruptions caused by the departure of the injured employee (e.g., 
production waste, time of bystanders); 
6. Occasional payments made to employees for "doubling up" after 
injured worker's departure; 
7. Additional insurance premiums. 
Costs were attached only to those categories which are variable (directly 
traceable to the accident and varying with the number of accidents) and fixed  
(incurred even if no accidents occurred) with clear opportunity costs (time 
could be more gainfully used in other ways). 





of additional insurance premiums, the following categories were judged to 
include either variable costs or to be fixed with clear opportunity costs. 
1.,2.,3. The wages of the injured employee, respective supervisor, and office 
personnel were fixed but were thought to have a clear opportunity 
cost associated with them. That is, wages would be paid regardless 
of whether an accident occurred; however, these individuals could 
be more gainfully employed in other activities had an accident not 
occurred. 
4. The wages of the individual assigned to first aid were also fixed 
but were not judged to include opportunity costs since the person 
was primarily responsible for first aid. 
5.,6. Disruptions caused by the departure of the injured employee and the 
occasional bonus payments were definitely affected by increases or 
decreases in injuries and were, therefore, a variable cost. 
7. The cost of additional insurance premiums were, unfortunately, not 
included because it was impossible to determine a specific premium 
reduction given a specific reduction in the number of injuries/ 
accidents. Exact formulae are not available to the public, including 
the insurance agent. Even if the exact formulae were known, the 
reductions for a given firm are considerably delayed. Premiums are 
based on two factors: a) a class rate which varies with industry 
experience and changes in federally mandated benefits, and b) an 
experience rate which is based, in part, on the payout of medical 
and indemnity payments for three consecutive years not counting the 
immediately preceding year. Thus, the effect of a reduction in 
accidents not only is delayed by one year but also is diluted by 
another two year's experience. 
The costs for each category were determined as follows: 
1.,2.,3. Based on interviews with plant personnel, the time losses per 
accident for injured employee, supervisor, and office personnel were 
estimated to be 2.25 hours, .33 hours, and .33 hours, respectively. 
The average hourly wages (determined by sampling hourly wages twice 
in each year) were then multiplied by each of the respective time 
estimates. 
5.,6. The disruptions and occasional bonus payments were combined into a 
general disruption category. Again based on interviews with plant 
personnel, the time loss per accident was estimated to be 2.25 hours 
of an employee's time. The total cost for this category was calcu-
lated as the above time estimate multiplied by the average hourly 
wage. 
To arrive at the total uninsured cost per accident, the costs of employee, 
supervisor, and office personnel and the disruption cost were added together. 
Table 1 presents the uninsured costs per accident for five years in both 
Effects of 
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actual and adjusted dollar figures. To take the rate of inflation into 
account, each year's total was adjusted using Consumer Price Index figures 
with 1979 as the base year. 
Table 1 






1975 $ 13.64 $ 18.41 
1976 14.46 18.42 
1977 15.75 18.77 
1978 17.49 19.61 
1979 19.79 19.79 
To arrive at the total cost per accident, the uninsured and insured costs 
were summed. 
Results  
Figure 2 depicts the total cost per accident for the departments combined 
during the three experimental conditions for 1979, the year of the research, 
and a four year average for 1975 thru 1978. Particularly noteworthy is the 
reduction in the cost per accident during 1979. The greatest reduction 
Figure 2 
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occurred during Baseline, from $612.64 to $59.63, a tenfold cost savings. 
The average cost per accident also declined substantially during the Conse-
quent Condition, when the behavioral safety program was in effect, from 
$700.22 to $306.16 per accident, a cost savings of $394.06 per accident. A 
relatively slight decrease occurred during the Antecedent Condition, from 
$176.77 to $84.76 per accident. 
Table 2 presents the average cost per accident by department during the 
three experimental conditions for 1979, the year of the research, and for 
comparable time periods during the preceding four years, 1975-1978. Of note 
is the range in the average cost. Costs ranged dramatically from a low of 
$19.79 in Cut-Up and Bagging during the Consequent Condition to a high of 
$6,839.56 two years before. Inspection of the data showed that high average 
costs were unduly influenced by accidents whose medical or indemnity payments 
or both were in the extreme tail of the distribution. Because of the dispro-
portionate effect of these outliers, defined as payments exceeding $500, they 
were removed. 
Figure 3 shows the average cost per accident with the outliers removed 
for the departments combined during the three experimental conditions for 
Figure 3 
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Table 2 
Total Coat Per Injury by 
Department and Year 
Department and Condition 
Year Chill & Pack  Evisceration I Evisceration II Cut-Up & Bagging 
Baseline Antecedent Consequent  Baseline 	Antecedent 	Consequent Baseline 	Antecedent 	Consequent Baseline Antecedent Consequent 
1975 0 59.41 86.75 3089.09 359.65 310.03 61.78 126.13 86.29 1673.39 376.38 196.09 
1976 0 95.38 133.88 114.71 49.86 129.87 1322.39 142.06 84.35 71.57 62.31 849.94 
1977 0 61.67 110.81 87.21 0 139.13 62.58 110.81 82.49 894.33 90.55 6839.56 
1978 69.11 453.01 1146.01 472.59 69.11 623.37 105.01 85.29 80.47 53.16 65.81 127.41 
Average 
1975-78 69.11 152.74 451.00 1263.28 244.94 341.55 435.73 118.28 83.88 682.44 191.11 1924.43 







1979 and a four year average for 1975 thru 1978. The average cost per 
accident during the Consequent Condition, when the behavioral safety program 
was in effect, declined from $98.57 to $82.56, a cost savings of $16.01 per 
accident. However, there were also substantial reductions during Baseline. 
During 1979, the cost was $59.63; prior to that, it was $82.45, a difference 
of $22.82 per accident. In contrast, during the Antecedent Condition when 
only the rules and reminders were in effect, there was essentially no change 
in the cost per accident. During 1979, the cost was $84.76; prior to that it 
was $82.53. 
Table 3 presents the frequency of accidents by department for the three 
experimental conditions and the comparable period during the preceding four 
years, 1975-1978. Table 4 presents the frequency of medical treatment 
injuries for all departments combined which occurred during the three experi-
mental conditions in 1979 and comparable time periods during 1975-1978. 
Table 4 
Difference in Frequency of Injuries 
Baseline 
Conditions 
Antecedent Condition Consequent Condition 
Average 18.5 16.75 32.25 
1975-1978 
1979 20.0 25.0 36.0 
% Increase 108% 149% 112% 
Although more injuries occurred during 1979, the year of the research, than 
during the same periods of the four preceding years, the increases were rela-
tively slight during Baseline and the Consequent Condition, with increases 
of 108% and 112%, respectively. In contrast, a substantial increase occurred 
during the Antecedent Condition. One and a half times as many accidents took 
Table 3 
Frequency of Medical Treatment Accidents 
Department and Condition 
Year Chill & Pack Evisceration I Evisceration II Cut-Up & Bagging 
Baseline Antecedent Consequent Baseline 	Antecedent Consequent Baseline 	Antecedent Consequent Baseline Antecedent Consequent 
1975 0 3 14 6 8 15 6 9 15 6 6 4 
1976 0 4 7 2 2 12 10 8 3 7 2 4 
1977 0 1 3 4 0 6 8 4 5 4 6 3 
1978 1 2 12 5 3 15 11 7 9 4 2 2 
Average 
1975-78 .25 2.5 9 4.25 3.25 12 8.75 7 8 5.25 4 3.25 
1979 0 2 10 5 7 16 8 11 9 7 5 1 
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place during this condition than during the same periods of the preceding 
four years. 
Discussion  
The present study demonstrated the steps involved in assessing the 
financial impact of a behavioral safety program on work place accidents. 
Both direct and indirect costs attributable to job-related injuries were 
assessed. The direct costs included both medical and indemnity payments made 
by the insurance carrier. The indirect or uninsured costs were determined by 
identifying the events triggered by accidents and then determining the cost 
associated with each event. The events included the time of the injured 
employee, his or her supervisor, office and first aid personnel, as well as a 
general disruption category and the cost of additional insurance premiums. 
Costs were attached to those events which vary with the number of accidents 
(e.g., time of injured employee) or which have clear opportunity costs (e.g., 
supervisory time). Employee time, for instance, was calculated as the 
average amount of time spent per accident multiplied by the average hourly 
wage. To determine the cost per accident, both the direct and indirect costs 
were added together. 
To determine the cost savings, if any, that would occur as a result of 
the behavioral safety program, the costs attributable to job-related injuries 
were assessed. The assumption was that the improvement in the level of safe 
performance which occurred during the behavioral safety program should result 
in a decrease in the number of accidents or a reduction in their costs or 
both. 
No clear-cut conclusions were drawn about cost savings resulting from 
the behavioral safety program. There was no decrease in the number of 
accidents. Cost reductions did occur; however, they took place during both 
1 Effects of 15 
Baseline and the Consequent Condition. Thus, cost savings could not be 
attributed to the behavioral safety program alone. One possibility is that 
the activities involved in the specification of desired performance and the 
establishment of an observation safety code resulted in all parties--
management, supervisors, and employees--becoming more aware of the area of 
safety during Baseline. Another possibility is that there was a decrease 
in the frequency or severity of the accidents being reported. Whatever was 
responsible for the reduction in costs during Baseline, it was relatively 
short-lived, as evidenced by the results of the next phase, the Antecedent 
Condition. 
The most provocative finding regards the Antecedent Condition, which 
consisted of several common improvement strategies-7the posting of safety 
rules, the provision of training, and the weekly supervisory meetings 
reminding employees about safety. During the Antecedent Condition there 
were substantial increases in the frequency of accidents and the cost 
reductions were either slight or nonexistent (when the outliers were re-
moved). At the very least, these findings suggest that a behavioral safety 
program is likely to be more effective than a traditional training program 
which only focuses on the improvement strategies listed above. 
Although the present study was an initial step in the direction of 
understanding the financial impact of a behavioral safety program on 
work place accidents, two primary problems arose. One, a significant cost, 
that of the insurance premium, was not included because of the unknown and 
delayed nature of rate setting. Two, the site itself was not experiencing 
serious safety problems, thus diluting the potential effect of the behavi-
oral safety program. Relatively few serious injuries involving time away 
from work had or were occurring at the site. Prior to the research year, 
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there were an average of 7 lost-time injuries for the entire plant; during 
the research year, only 5 occurred. As a result, the focus of the present 
study was on medical treatment injuries, which are less severe and notori-
ously unreliable. If a change in medical treatment injuries is reported, it 
is often not clear whether the actual frequency improved, the reporting 
changed, or persons' perceptions shifted. In the future, it is suggested 
that financial impact be assessed in a site with a more serious safety 
problem. 
Despite these shortcomings, the present study illustrates a methodol-
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